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Abstract 
Judicial review may be the most publicly contested aspect of 
American constitutionalism. The conventional beliefs that judicial 
review should be understood as an idea and American 
constitutionalism studied as a new rationalistic, political science 
are largely due to the influential scholarship of Edward Corwin. 
This brief essay recovers the pre-Corwin discussion about the 
origins of judicial review to demonstrate the way in which the 
approach to judicial review as an idea has been, itself, historically 
constructed by scholarly inclination, disciplinary identification, 
and the availability of historical materials 
 
 Judicial review may be the most publicly contested aspect of American 
constitutionalism. When courts void legislation, they implicitly seem to strike at 
the heart of the principle of separation of powers. The act inherently suggests that 
the elected legislature is not always the legitimate representative of the people and 
that democratic majoritarianism is not the fundamental principle of American 
politics. Because judicial review can be described in opposition to ideas often 
deemed fundamental to American constitutionalism, the origins of judicial review 
have intrigued scholars of politics, history, and law.1 For the last century, the 
origins inquiry has started from the assumption that the origins of judicial review 
lie in an idea, an intellectual doctrine about judicial power. In fact, the origins of 
judicial review lie in a pre-Revolutionary practice and idea of limited legislative 
authority. 
                                                 
∗ Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. My thanks to the participants in the Boston 
University-Cambridge Conference, in particular, Julian Zelizer and Bruce Schulman, and Aviam 
Soifer and Mark Spiegel for comments and to Michael Fleming, Michael Smith, and Nicole 
Liguori for research assistance.  
1 Recent articles with titles on the origins of judicial review include Mary Sarah Bilder, The 
Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502 (2006) [hereinafter, Bilder, Corporate 
Origins]; Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 887 (2003); Symposium: The Constitutional Origins of Judicial Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1 (2003); Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall 
Court Made More out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787 (1999); Charles F. Hobson, The 
Origins of Judicial Review: A Historian’s Explanation, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 811 (1999); Jack 
N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031 
(1997). 
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The conventional story, recounted in most law school casebooks and 
therefore drilled into the minds of most lawyers, does not discuss pre-
Revolutionary practices. It begins in 1803 with Marbury v. Madison.2 In some 
versions, Chief Justice Marshall invents judicial review himself, often constructed 
as a sneaky judicial power grab. In other versions, he draws on a seventeenth-
century English legal idea or early state judicial precedents to claim this power for 
the federal judiciary over congressional legislation. In all of these versions, 
American colonial legal practices are inaccurately given little significance and 
judicial review presented as an issue of the legitimacy of the judiciary. 
Marshall did not invent judicial review. Judicial review developed from a 
longstanding English practice of reviewing the bylaws of corporations for 
repugnancy to the laws of England.3 During the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries, Edward Coke and other English judges affirmed and 
justified this practice as based on an understanding that a delegated authority 
possessed only limited legislative power. Because early colonial settlements were 
initially structured as corporations, this practice was extended to the American 
colonies.  
By the eighteenth century, the original corporate practice became a 
transatlantic colonial constitution that American colonial law could not be 
repugnant to the laws of England. This constitutional limit appeared written into 
colonial charters, English parliamentary legislation, and royal instructions to 
governors and other officials. The Privy Council enforced the limited nature of 
colonial authority through review of colonial legislation and appeals from colonial 
courts to the Privy Council. The meaning of repugnancy to the laws of England, 
however, was always contested, in particular because divergences due to local 
conditions and circumstances were permitted. For decades, colonial and English 
lawyers and government officials argued over the application of the limit in 
numerous specific cases and contexts.  
After 1776, repugnancy practice and this assumption of limited legislative 
authority persisted. In place of “the laws of England,” post-Revolutionary lawyers 
substituted the “constitution.” State courts reviewed state legislation for 
repugnancy to new state constitutions. At the Constitutional Convention, the 
Framers assumed that repugnancy practice would continue. The Constitution’s 
supremacy clause and jurisdictional grant to the Supreme Court reflected the 
persistent assumption that legislative authority would continue to be limited by 
                                                 
2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see, e.g., NORMAN REDLICH, ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed., 2002); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-9 (2d ed. 
2005); JESSE CHOPER, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed. 2001) (all beginning with Marbury). 
Brief mentions of Privy Council review and Dr. Bonham’s Case appear in KATHLEEN SULLIVAN 
& GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 (15th ed., 2004); CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 17 (2d ed. 2005); RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES 13 (7th ed. 2003). 
3 See Bilder, Corporate Origins, supra note 1 (containing extended version of this argument); see 
also MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE 
AND THE EMPIRE (2004).  
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the practice of repugnancy review. As James Madison stated, “A law violating a 
constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by the 
Judges as null & void.”4  
After 1787, the practice became part of American constitutionalism. 
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act incorporated repugnancy language for review of 
state legislation. Supreme Court justices stated they agreed with the principle. In 
Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall confirmed the “long and well established” 
principle that “a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well 
as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”5
The conventional beliefs that judicial review should be understood as an 
idea and American constitutionalism studied as a new rationalistic, political 
science are largely due to the influential scholarship of Edward Corwin. Prior to 
Corwin, those who discussed the origins of judicial review struggled to reconcile 
historical practice and ideas; after Corwin, ideas alone proved decisive. The 
growing division among law, history, and political science ensured that this 
significant shift in approach was not revisited.6  
This brief essay recovers the pre-Corwin discussion about the origins of 
judicial review to demonstrate the way in which the approach to judicial review as 
an idea has been, itself, historically constructed by scholarly inclination, 
disciplinary identification, and the availability of historical materials. Although 
many scholars writing on the origins issue between 1880 and 1920 were 
motivated by the contemporary Supreme Court, this essay does not delve into the 
politics of the debate. Over the years, these historical arguments and the 
conception of idea and practice have favored or opposed the Court depending on 
the political alignment of the Court and Congress. Instead, this essay focuses on 
the conception of judicial review and the perceived relevance of colonial 
experience and practice.  
 
I. Judicial Review as Doctrine and Practice 
What contemporary scholars and the public call “judicial review” 
originally had no such name. Indeed, until the early twentieth century, 
commentators identified it descriptively as courts voiding legislation repugnant to 
a constitution. After the Civil War, three different understandings of the origins of 
this judicial capacity arose. These understandings can be linked with individual 
lawyers whose intellectual and professional backgrounds guided their inquiries.  
The judicially-oriented Horace Gray described this judicial capacity as an 
                                                 
4 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 93 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) 
(July 23).  
5 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 180. 
6 The division appeared in the chartering of the American Historical Association (1884), the 
American Association of Law Schools (1900), and the American Political Science Association 
(1903). See G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. 
REV. 485, 509 (2002). 
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intellectual doctrine with roots in seventeenth-century English law, in particular, 
Dr. Bonham’s Case. The young lawyer William Meigs saw it as part of a new 
political science traceable through materials related to the Constitution’s framing. 
The lawyer-historian Brinton Coxe suggested it could be viewed as a practice 
with origins in the colonial imperial relationship, in particular, the Privy Council’s 
review in Winthrop v. Lechmere. At the end of the century, Harvard Law 
Professor James Bradley Thayer sought to embrace all three understandings.   
Horace Gray (1828-1902), perhaps more than others, was initially 
responsible for the argument that the doctrine of “judicial duty” had its origins in 
seventeenth-century English law. In 1865, Gray wrote an appendix to a collection 
of reports of Massachusetts colonial court cases.7 The volume as a whole 
implicitly suggested continuities between the current Supreme Judicial Court and 
its colonial predecessor. Gray’s interest lay in a 1761 case involving an argument 
by James Otis, a Massachusetts lawyer and future Revolutionary and, in 
particular, one aspect of this argument. In the case, Otis reportedly argued that 
“As to Acts of Parliament. an Act against the Constitution is void: an Act against 
natural Equity is void.”8 Gray had to go out of his way to comment on this 
sentence. Otis’ comment actually never appeared in the reports because the 
author, Josiah Quincy, had been “absent … most of the Time” during Otis’ 
argument.9   
Gray concluded that “the principle of American Constitutional Law, that it 
is the duty of the judiciary to declare unconstitutional statutes void” had been 
“foreshadowed” in the argument by Otis.10 Gray referred to this belief as a 
“doctrine,” “a favorite in the Colonies before the Revolution.”11 Gray found its 
origins in “some of the highest authorities in the English law,” in particular, Chief 
Justice Edward Coke’s comment in Dr. Bonham’s Case (1610).12 Although the 
reference to Coke had appeared previously, Gray linked it tightly and approvingly 
to the judicial duty.13 He declared that “this duty was recognized, and 
                                                 
7 JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, app. 1, at 
395, 521 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1865) (appendix written by Horace Gray, Jr.) (discussing 
Paxton’s Case (the Writs of Assistance Case)). 
8 Id. at 474.   
9 Id. at 55 
10 Id. at 395, 521. Otis reportedly argued that “As to Acts of Parliament. an Act against the 
Constitution is void: an Act against natural Equity is void.” Id. at 474.  A new edition of the 
reports is forthcoming by Daniel R. Coquillette.   
11 Id. at 527.  
12 Id. at 521; see Dr. Bonham’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B.) (“[I]t appears in our 
books, that in many cases, the common law will . . . controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes 
adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and 
reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge 
such Act to be void . . . .”). 
13 See GEORGE RICHARD MINOT, CONTINUATION OF THE HISTORY OF THE PROVINCE OF 
MASSACHUSETTS BAY FROM THE YEAR 1748 TO 1765, at 98 (1803); 2 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, 
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unconstitutional acts set aside, by courts of justice, even before the adoption of 
the Constitution of the United States.”14 This power was thus now “too well 
settled to require an accumulation of authorities.”15
Gray’s approach reflected his judicial viewpoint. Born in 1828, Gray had 
come of age amidst Boston antislavery discussions.  Between 1854 and 1861, he 
served as reporter to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and, in 1864, 
became a justice on that Court.16 The Massachusetts Court had accepted that 
courts had the power to void legislation repugnant to the Constitution since the 
early nineteenth century.17 Gray’s comfort with this capacity was evident in an 
1857 critique he wrote of the Dred Scott decision. Nowadays, the decision is often 
classified as the second example of judicial review but Gray did not view the case 
in that category. Gray’s criticism focused instead on the unnecessary 
“extrajudicial” reach of the decision.18   
The analysis also characterized his larger idea about the origins of 
American law.  He had become court reporter at twenty-six.  The “indefatigable 
research” and focus on judicial cases was characteristic.19 The desire to connect 
American legal doctrine with English legal precedents would further typify 
Gray’s vision. He “delighted to go to the fountains of the law and trace its growth 
from the beginning.”20 On the Supreme Court, he became known for studying 
                                                                                                                                     
THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 124 n. 1, 521-525 (1850) (discussing argument but not judicial 
review); see also 4 GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE, UNITED STATES 414, 416 n. 1 (1856) 
(recounting argument as “the opening scene of American resistance” and the origin of the 
“revolutionary doctrine … which esteemed reason and the constitution superior to an act of 
parliament”).   
14 QUINCY, supra note 7, at 529.  
15 Id. at 530.  
16 Summary of Events, 8 AM. L. REV. 167 (1873-1874). 
17 See Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 252, 253 (1815); see also James M. Rosenthal, 
Massachusetts Acts and Resolves Declared Unconstitutional by the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, 1 MASS. L.Q. 301-318 (1916) (discussing cases).  
18 [HORACE GRAY AND JOHN LOWELL], A LEGAL REVIEW OF THE CASE OF DRED SCOTT, (Boston: 
Crosby and Nichols, 1857); see also THOMAS BENTON, HISTORICAL AND LEGAL EXAMINATION OF 
… THE DRED SCOTT CASE, WHICH DECLARES THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MISSOURI 
COMPROMISE ACT … 4 (photo reprint 1969) (1857) (criticizing decision but not because of lack of 
authority over congressional acts). Gray belonged to the Free Soil party and opposed slavery.  See 
Herbert Parker, Memorial, 182 Mass. 613, 615 (1903). Whether Dred Scott was an example of 
judicial review intrigued others. See 131 U.S. ccxxv (1888) (omitting case from list of examples of 
review of congressional legislation); BRINTON COXE, AN ESSAY ON JUDICIAL POWER AND 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION 10 (photo. reprint 2005) (1893) (arguing for inclusion as the 
“first in which an act of Congress was decided by the court to be unconstitutional for reasons not 
relating to its own judicial department of the government”); J.B.T., Review, 7 HARV. L. REV. 380, 
381 (1894) (stating there “are reasons for omitting that case to which he does not advert, but there 
was at least as much reason for inserting it as in the case of two or three others that are there)”.  
19 A Day in a Massachusetts Court, 9 ALB. L.J. 283 (1874). 
20 Parker, supra note 18, at 620. 
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“expositions of law most eagerly in the opinions of the English judges, which 
seemed to him to furnish the best standards for the American courts.”21
Gray’s argument about this judicial doctrine proved more influential than 
might have been expected of comments made in an appendix to a volume of 
colonial reports. His friends at Harvard Law School where his half-brother, James 
Chipman Gray, taught, included another important commentator on the judicial 
doctrine, James Bradley Thayer. In 1882, Gray had the opportunity to apply his 
ideas about judicial duty to the Supreme Court when he became a Justice on the 
United States Supreme Court, serving for twenty years. Although in the 1870s, 
the Court had begun to void congressional legislation, after Gray joined, the Court 
increasingly seemed comfortable with judicial review. Among other decisions, 
Gray joined the majority in the controversial decision in the Civil Rights Cases 
(1883), holding unconstitutional the 1875 Civil Rights Act.22 The following year, 
he wrote the majority opinion in Julliard v. Greenman (1884), the last of the legal 
tender cases.23 Lastly, Gray may have had a direct influence on later advocates of 
judicial review, in particular, Louis Brandeis, who served as a judicial clerk for 
Gray on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.24
A young Philadelphia lawyer, William Meigs (1852-1929), found the 
Coke argument less persuasive. Born in 1852, Meigs would go on to write 
biographies of Charles Jared Ingersoll, John Calhoun, and Thomas Hart Benton.25 
He would become perhaps best known for The Growth of the Constitution in the 
Federal Convention of 1787 with its publication and attribution of the draft of the 
Constitution used by the Committee of Detail.26 The subtitle explained the 
impressive work: “An effort to trace the origin and development of each separate 
clause from its first suggestion in that body to the form finally approved.”27  
This fascination with the constitutional founding appeared in Meigs’ 
influential 1885 article on “the judicial power.”28 Meigs rejected the Coke 
                                                 
21 Marcus Perrin Knowlton, Memorial, 182 Mass. 622, 624 (1903). 
22 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  
23 Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884). 
24 See Robert Bloom, The Origin of the Supreme Judicial Court Law Clerk System (2002), 
http://sjclawclerks.socialaw.com/history.htm. 
25 WILLIAM M. MEIGS, THE LIFE OF CHARLES JARED INGERSOLL (1897); WILLIAM M. MEIGS, THE 
LIFE OF THOMAS HART BENTON (1904); WILLIAM M. MEIGS, THE LIFE OF JOHN CALDWELL 
CALHOUN (1917). 
26 WILLIAM M. MEIGS, THE GROWTH OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, 317 (1900). 
27 Id. at title page. 
28 William M. Meigs, The Relation of the Judiciary to the Constitution, 19 AM. L. REV. 175, 176, 
177 (1885) (noting the recent decision in the Civil Rights Cases).  Meigs was drawn to the topic in 
part because of Richard Street’s controversial paper, “How Far Questions of Public Policy May 
Enter into Judicial Decisions,” presented at the American Bar Association meeting. See 6 REPORT 
OF THE … ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 179 (1883); Meigs, The 
Relation, supra note 28, at 198. 
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argument as one of “a few scattering cases” based on either basic common law 
principles or “vagaries inspired by an overweaning admiration for the common 
law and a bold and independent spirit.”29  He declared, instead, that the 
“American doctrine” was “emphatically a new departure in governmental 
science.”30  
The assertion of this “new and original” doctrine could be traced in a 
series of cases decided between 1778 and 1787.31 Meigs discussed what has 
become a familiar line-up: Phillips, Commonwealth v. Caton, Rutgers v. 
Waddington, Holmes v. Walton, Trevett v. Weeden, Bayard v. Singleton.32 Having 
established the judicial doctrine in the states, Meigs turned to the Federal 
Convention.  He declared that “these assertions of power by the courts were in 
general approved by the country, and Gerry expressly stated so in the Federal 
Convention.”33 Relying on Elliott’s Debates, Meigs counted six delegates in 
support at the Federal Convention and numerous others in support at state 
ratifying conventions.34  He argued that the Federalist discussed it “not as a 
novelty” but to “answer objections which might still trouble some persons.”35 In 
legal commentators, post-1787 state and federal cases, and finally Marbury, 
Meigs found repeated acceptance of the doctrine.36 He concluded that “the 
doctrine has been received” with “unanimity and general absence of serious 
conflict.”37
For Meigs, the founding origins story did not answer all questions related 
to the application of the judicial power in contemporary debates. In particular, 
Meigs believed that the early history did not demonstrate that judicial decisions 
had been judged conclusive. He insisted that the earlier theory was that “there is 
no department of the government which can irrevocably settle for all whether 
such or such a power can be constitutionally exercised.”38  The judiciary, 
according to Meigs, did not bind other departments or “conclusively settle the 
meaning of the constitution.”39  If a department concluded that the court was 
                                                 
29 Id.at 176, 177. He noted that the “doctrine of Coke” likely “had its part in the matter” but 
emphasized post-Revolutionary decisions. Id. at 177-178.  
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 177. 
32 Id. at 178-182. 
33 Id. at 182-183. 
34 Id. at 184-185; see 5 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 (1845). 
35 Id. at 184-185. 
36 Id. at 185-187. 
37 Id. at 188. 
38 Id. at 199.   
39 Id. at 202. 
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wrong, it was their “duty” to “decline to follow the judiciary’s opinion.”40 
Nonetheless, the judiciary had the power. 
This argument that judicial power was part of the new political science of 
American government and that its origins could be traced in founding documents 
appealed to other young lawyers and practitioners of political science. Charles 
Burke Elliott (1861-1935) addressed the issue in an article aptly titled, The 
Legislatures and the Courts: The Power to Declare Statutes Unconstitutional. 
Elliott had a law degree from the University of Iowa and received the first Ph.D. 
in history from the University of Minnesota in 1888. His advisors taught in 
history and political science.41 Elliott alter became a law professor, judge, and 
noted author of treatises on corporations and insurance. 
The growing influence of political science was evident in the placement of 
the article in an early issue of the new Political Science Quarterly.42 Elliott 
emphasized the way in which the “new and original” idea in political science that 
“the judiciary was made a co-ordinate department of government” altered 
understandings of judicial power.43 Elliott believed that by 1787 “the idea of 
controlling the legislature through the judiciary must have been familiar” to 
members of the Convention.44 As Elliott summarized, the “doctrine” was “of 
course the outgrowth of a written constitution and a federal system of 
government” presumed became of a desire to limit legislative power.45 Unlike 
Meigs, Elliott did not find in the historical origins much guidance on precisely 
when and how the courts should apply the doctrine. His concluding normative 
discussion was conducted entirely on theoretical grounds.46  
A third group of historically-interested lawyers did not view this judicial 
capacity as part of a new political science invented at the founding or the adoption 
of an English ida about parliamentary power.  They saw similarities in the Privy 
Council’s review of colonial legislation. In particular, they puzzled over the 
meaning of Winthrop v. Lechmere, an appeal from Connecticut in which Privy 
Council had declared void the colony’s intestate act. Materials related to Winthrop 
had begun to appear in the late nineteenth-century publication projects of state 
historical societies. Based solely on a few initial documents from the appeal, 
Brooks Adams—lawyer and historian—had concluded that it showed “the process 
by which the conception of constitutional limitations became rooted in the minds 
                                                 
40 Id. . 
41 Tim Brady, The Ph.D. and the Northeastern Fisheries, MINNESOTA MAGAZINE (2005).  
42 Charles B. Elliott, The Legislatures and the Courts: The Power to Declare Statutes 
Unconstitutional, 5 POL. SCI. QTLY. 224, 230 (1890). 
43 Id. at 229. 
44 Id. at 239. 
45 Id. at 230. 
46 Id. at 252-258. 
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of the first generation of lawyers.”47 Constitutional limitations on legislative 
power had predisposed revolutionaries and constitutional framers to a judicial 
power to declare legislation void. The 1890s brought the publication of additional 
papers related to the Winthrop appeal and its connections to “questions of 
constitutional law” were further explored.48
Most influential among these writers was Brinton Coxe (1833-1892). In an 
influential posthumously-published book, An Essay on Judicial Power and 
Unconstitutional Legislation (1893), Coxe argued that the Constitution expressly 
authorized the judicial power.49 A member of the Philadelphia bar, Coxe had 
served as President of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. He had long been 
interested in colonial history and in the general question of the origins of laws.  In 
1866, he translated a German judge’s work on the influence of the Roman law on 
Bracton.50 Coxe was apparently “an ardent Democrat and a strict 
constructionist.”51 A memorialist stated that his “’feeling towards the Constitution 
… was a passion; he was possessed of it, and he mourned almost as a personal 
calamity whatever he looked on as an impairment of its sacred obligation.’”52   
Coxe’s book supported the judicial power. The book ranged far and wide 
in its effort to bring all sources to bear on the origins of the power. German law, 
Roman law, Canon law, English law were surveyed. The 1780s cases and 
Convention commentary reviewed. Amidst this material, one chapter discussed 
colonial limits on legislation and the Winthrop appeal. Coxe suggested that the 
                                                 
47 BROOKS ADAMS, THE EMANCIPATION OF MASSACHUSETTS: THE DREAM AND THE REALITY 
(1886) (discussing Winthrop at 293-302). For the decree, see THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE 
COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, 1726-1735, at 191-192, 571-579 (1873). For materials related to 
another appeal, Philip v. Savage, see  PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL 
SOCIETY FOR 1860-1862, 64-80, 165-171.  
48 Mellen Chamberlain, Remarks on The Talcott Papers, 8 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 1892-1894 (2nd ser.) 123 (1894); 1 THE TALCOTT PAPERS: 
CORRESPONDENCE AND DOCUMENTS (CHIEFLY OFFICIAL) DURING JOSEPH TALCOTT’S 
GOVERNORSHIP OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, 1724-1741 (1892).  Chamberlain was a lawyer, 
Chief Justice of the Boston Municipal Court, antiquarian, and the Librarian for the Boston Public 
Library. Adams and Thayer both acknowledged his assistance in their works on the judicial 
power. 
49 COXE, supra note 18. Coxe’s book was an extensive reply to Philadelphia lawyer, Richard 
McMurtie. McMurtie argued that the judicial power had been acquired solely as a “mere 
deduction of logic, by inference, and with no basis in the Constitution. RICHARD C. MCMURTIE, 
OBSERVATIONS ON MR. GEORGE BANCROFT’S PLEA FOR THE CONSTITUTION 13-14 (1886). In turn, 
McMurtie’s pamphlet responded to George Bancroft’s criticism of Gray’s statement in Julliard 
that congressional power included aspects belonging “to sovereignty in other civilized nations, and 
not expressly withheld from congress by the constitution.” See GEORGE BANCROFT, A PLEA FOR 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WOUNDED IN THE HOUSE OF ITS GUARDIANS (1886); 
Julliard, 110 U.S. at 450.   
50 2 HAMPTON L. CARSON, A HISTORY OF THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA 9 (1940).   
51 Id. at 10.  Corwin considered Coxe a “conservative.” EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW: ITS LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BASIS AND OTHER ESSAYS 2 (1914).   
52 Id. at 12 (quoting proceedings of the memorial meeting in 1892). 
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appeal might show that “an English model existed … for the American judicial 
competency.”53 To encourage further research, Coxe reprinted the order in the 
Winthrop appeal in his appendix.54  
That the colonial period could be responsible for aspects of American 
constitutionalism intrigued others. One young historian soon destined for law 
school explained the constitutional implications at the American Historical 
Association’s Annual Meeting.55 Harold D. Hazeltine explained that “[d]uring the 
development of this practice, … the important doctrine of American jurisprudence 
which grants to the judiciary the power of setting aside an act of the legislature as 
being repugnant to the fundamental law of the land received sanction from 
England ….”56 He sought to illuminate this “neglected phase of our constitutional 
history.”57 As he declared, “we now appreciate more fully than ever that the 
systems of society and government developing in the colonies finally come to 
possess a broader usefulness in the constitutional life of the United States.”58 
There had been “doubtless many” cases that would “throw light upon 
contemporaneous views of the courts as to their powers to interpret colonial 
charters,” but unfortunately only a few were known.59 Nonetheless, those 
interested in the intertwining of history and political science found appealing the 
argument that the judicial power had arisen from colonial and imperial 
practices.60
                                                 
53 COXE, supra note 18, at 212; see also Thomas Reaburn White, Some Recent Criticism of 
Gelpcke versus Dubuque (Part IV), 47 Am. L. Reg. 657, 665 (1899) (attempting to apply Coxe’s 
discussion of Winthrop to current cases); J. Westlake, Judicial Power in the United States, 11 L. 
Q. REV. 81, 84 (1895) (review of Coxe’s book, noting that it traced the “environment in which the 
framers of the constitution of 1787 were placed”). Coxe struggled to fit the Privy Council’s action 
into American constitutionalism’s distinction of legislative versus judicial action despite 
recognizing that the distinction made no sense applied to the imperial relationship and the 
prerogative. Id. at 212-213.  
54 COXE, supra note 18, at 370-382; see also id. at 198-199 (reprinted attorney general and 
solicitor general opinion in the case). 
55 Harold D. Hazeltine, Appeals from Colonial Courts to the King in Council, with Especial 
Reference to Rhode Island, 18 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSN. FOR THE 
YEAR 1894, at 299-300 (1895).  In November 1894, Charles M. Andrews published an extensive 
article on Winthrop but with little interest beyond the imperial relationship. Charles McLean 
Andrews, The Connecticut Intestacy Law, 3 YALE REV. 261-294 (1894). 
56 Hazeltine, supra note 55, 299-300, 345. The “King in council” was the “supreme court of the 
colonies” and the “noble predecessor of a still nobler tribunal, the Supreme Court of the United 
States.” Id. at 345, 350. 
57 Id. at 300.  
58 Id. at 299. 
59 Andrew McFarland Davis, The Case of Frost v. Leighton, 2 AM. HIST. REV. 229 (1897). 
60 See 5 JOHN BACH MCMASTER, A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE 
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 394 (New York, 1927) (1900) (explaining that judges “had 
assumed the right to set aside acts of legislation which in their opinion were unconstitutional” as 
the “slow outcome of circumstances”). Wilson also accepted the colonial practice claim as the 
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Harvard Law School professor James Bradley Thayer merged these three 
different claims about the origins of the judicial power. Although Thayer was 
known for his work in evidence,61 he also wrote in influential article in 1893 on 
the “American doctrine of constitutional law.”62 His description of a rule of 
administration for the “narrow”63 judicial power is seen as the “first systematic 
defense of what has come to be known as rationality review.”64 More importantly, 
Thayer taught constitutional law at Harvard for many years and wrote Cases on 
Constitutional Law (1895), a significant constitutional law casebook.65 Through 
the article, constitutional law class, and casebook, Thayer influenced leading legal 
figures such as Learned Hand, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Louis Brandeis, and 
Felix Frankfurter.66 A graduate of Harvard College and Law School, Thayer had 
worked as a lawyer in Boston before becoming a Harvard professor in 1874.67 
After Thayer’s death, one colleague noted that Thayer had loved “his historical 
work” the best.68  Another emphasized that Thayer had “little inclination” to show 
the law as necessarily “perfectly logical or entirely consistent body of legal 
doctrine.”  Instead, he was interested in “what the law was, and how it had grown 
up in this way rather than work out a more systematic and logical theory than the 
courts had made.”69  
                                                                                                                                     
origins of constitutional interpretation. See WOODROW WILSON, THE STATE: ELEMENTS OF 
HISTORICAL AND PRACTICAL POLITICS 462 (rev. ed. 1900).  
61 G. Edward White, Revisiting James Bradley Thayer, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 48, 66 n. 71 (1993). 
62 James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
HARV. L. REV. 129, 130 (1893); see Leonard W. Levy, Editorial Note, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND 
THE SUPREME COURT: SELECTED ESSAYS 43 (1967) (noting that Felix Frankfurter called it the 
“one piece of writing” on American constitutional law); Introduction: One Hundred Years of 
Judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 NW. U. L. REV. v (1993) (noting Henry 
Monaghan’s reference as “’the most influential essay ever written on American constitutional 
law’”). 
63 Thayer, The Origin, supra note 62, at 138; see James B. Thayer, Constitutionality of 
Legislation: The Precise Question for a Court, 38 NATION 314 (1884) (discussing issue without 
historical inquiry). Thayer’s essay in the Nation intriguingly foreshadowed later approached to 
judicial review by distinguishing questions of “personal rights under the Constitution” from those 
“determining the constitutionality of legislative action” in which the courts should ask whether the 
legislative construction is unreasonable. Id. 
64Introduction, supra note 62, at v. For contemporary criticism of Thayer’s thesis that “a judge 
should never declare an act of legislation unconstitutional, unless the constitutionality is beyond 
reasonable doubt,” see [Anon.], A Paper by Professor Thayer, 42 AM. L. REG. 73, 74-75 (1894). 
65 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1895). \ 
66 See Edward Pucell, Learned Hand: The Jurisprudential Trajectory of an Old Progressive, 43 
BUFFALO L. REV. 873, 884-885 (1995) (book review). 
67 On Thayer, see Jay Hook, A Brief Life of James Bradley Thayer, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1993); 
White, supra note 63, at 48.  
68 James Bradley Thayer, 15 HARV. L. REV. 598, 602 (1902) (comments of John Chipman Gray). 
69 Id. at 608 (comments of Samuel Williston). 
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Thayer liked the argument that judicial power had its origins in colonial 
history. In January 1894, Thayer reviewed Coxe’s book and referred to “the great 
colonial case” of Winthrop as a possible precedent for judicial power.70 That same 
year, he circulated the draft of his new constitutional law casebook with Winthrop 
v. Lechmere, as well as the note of his close friend, Horace Gray, on the Coke-
Otis connection.71 His article similarly explored the issue, “How did our 
American doctrine, which allows to the judiciary the power to declare legislative 
Acts unconstitutional … come about …?72 Twice Thayer stated that “this 
remarkable practice” was a “natural result” of colonial political experience.73 He 
broadly construed this practice as including enforcement of the colonial charters 
by forfeiture, parliamentary legislation, by “the direct annulling of legislation by 
the Crown,” and by “ultimate appeal to the Privy Council.”74  Thayer found the 
Coke and founding evidences compatible with this claim.75 He concluded that the 
post-Constitutional doctrine was merely a “new application of judicial power.”76 
As one reviewer of the article noted, Thayer had found the origin in the colonial 
period’s limitation on colonial assemblies.77
The existence of the colonial practice led in part to Thayer’s vision of the 
appropriate scope of judicial power.78 Thayer recognized that the practice was in 
tension with the belief that the “powers of government” could be 
                                                 
70 J.B.T., Review, supra note 18 (noting “Mr. Coxe abandons quite too readily the view that it 
involved a judicial declaration of the invalidity of the colonial Act”).  
71 1 THAYER, supra note 65, at 39-40 n.1 (seemingly disagreeing on the Privy Council decree as a 
“legislative, and not a judicial proceeding”); see Simeon E. Baldwin, Review, 1 AM. HIST. REV. 
163, 164-165, 167 (1895) (apparently confused over Winthrop).   
72 Thayer, Origin, supra note 62, at 130; see James B. Thayer, Constitutionality of Legislation: 
The Precise Question for a Court, 38 NATION 314 (1884) (discussing issue without historical 
inquiry).  
73 Thayer, Origin, supra note 62, 130-131.  
74 Id.  
75 He added that the “doctrine” was “probably helped into existence by a theory which found some 
favor among our ancestors at the time of the Revolution” and repeated Gray’s argument for a 
Coke-Otis connection. Id. at 133 and n. 2; see Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,  The History of the 
Judicial Impairment “Doctrine” and Its Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 
1432 n. 361 (noting friendship). His casebook indeed included a number of the cases first 
discussed by William Meigs. 1 THAYER, supra note 65, at 40-154 (including Commonwealth v. 
Caton, Rutgers v. Waddington, Trevett v. Weeden, Bayard v. Singleton, The Federalist, 
Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, Cooper v. Telfair, Marbury v. Madison, Fletcher v. Peck, Martin 
v. Hunter’s Lessee, Eakin v. Raub and Notes by Brinton Coxe and Thayer). 
76 Thayer, Origin, supra note 62, 132. 
77 [Anon.], Editorial Notes and Comments: A Paper by Professor Thayer, 42 AM. L. REG. 73, 74 
(1894). 
78 For more detailed historical interpretations of the article, see Mark Tushnet, Thayer’s Target: 
Judicial Review or Democracy?, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 9 (1993); G. Edward White, Revisiting James 
Bradley Thayer, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 48 (1993). 
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compartmentalized.79 The continuation of this practice had given judges a 
“judicial function” that also involved “taking a part . . . in the political conduct of 
government.”80 How should the practice and necessity of judicial voiding of 
statutes repugnant to the constitution be balanced with the theory of separation of 
powers? Thayer’s conclusion appeared to be courts should be cautious because 
they did make law, not merely interpret it.81
At the end of the nineteenth century, the judiciary’s practice of voiding 
statutes repugnant to the constitution understood as doctrine and practice, had a 
rich American history that pre-dated Marbury v. Madison. That Coke’s comment 
had some appeal to at least one Revolutionary seemed hard to disprove.  That the 
colonial practice of reviewing legislation and appeals had an impact on 
generations of colonial Americans seemed persuasive. That the founding 
generation had reconfigured this history as American seemed compelling. 
 
II. Judicial Review as Idea 
Yet, with the twentieth century, scholars would abandon this rich history 
for a far simpler story about the origins of American legal and governmental 
institutions. The Lochner decision reawoke the origins debate. Initially, the debate 
remained framed by the nineteenth-century discussion in which there had not 
seemed much question that the framers had an understanding of the judicial 
power. William Meigs himself had absorbed the colonial practice argument into 
his claim of a new political science. He insisted “this colonial training had an 
enormous influence” on the founders.82 Men “irresistibly think in grooves.”83 
Meigs explained, “The mind accustomed to looking upon acts of assembly as 
possibly void . . . could hardly avoid carrying this idea on to the new system.”84 
The colonial origins did not mean that the Court had always used the power 
correctly. Meigs emphasized, “gross blunders have been made” and “grave abuses 
have crept in.”85 Far too often courts made up their minds and then found reasons 
rather than reserving the power only for cases in which one could have no 
reasonable doubt about the violation of the constitution.86  
                                                 
79 Thayer, Origin, supra note 62, 134, see id. at 152. 
80 Id. at 152. 
81 Id. at 136-138.  
82 William Meigs, Some Recent Attacks on the American Doctrine of Judicial Power, 40 AM. L. 
REV. 641, 650 (1906); see also William M. Meigs, THE RELATION OF THE JUDICIARY TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 15-47 (photo reprint 1971) (1919) (discussing additional evidence including South 
Carolina judge’s discussion of whether colonial acts were void ab initio or only voidable by 
disallowance). 
83 Meigs, Some Recent Attacks, supra note 82, at 650. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 669 
86 Id. at 669-770. 
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For others, however, the colonial practice claim justified an unjustifiable 
power and needed to be vanquished. As one author wrote, no Framer had referred 
to Winthrop v. Lechmere. It was “fantastic … to assert that it shaped the 
conception of judicial power about to be created.”87 Indeed, “legal writers of 
respectable authority” increasingly suggested that the framers had not intended to 
grant this power.88 This debate over whether the Supreme Court had “’usurped’ 
the power to invalidate acts of Congress on constitutional grounds” became a 
“popular discussion characterized by no little sound and fury.”89
Edward Corwin came to this discussion opposed to the Court’s power. He 
had received his Ph.D. in history in 1905 and was hired by Woodrow Wilson into 
Princeton’s new department of history, politics, and economics. He would 
become “perhaps the foremost twentieth-century authority on the Constitution.”90 
Compared to Louis Boudin and perhaps even Charles Beard, Corwin was “not 
markedly ideological in his approach” to the Court and a “political 
independent.”91 Nevertheless, Corwin’s scholarship on the origins of judicial 
review had a particular conception of constitutionalism.  Corwin had doubts about 
“judicial paramountcy,” describing the Court as “another human, and therefore 
presumably fallible, institution—a bench of judges.”92
In bestowing the term “judicial review” upon this capacity, Edward 
Corwin permanently reframed twentieth-century understandings of the role of 
courts. In 1906, he suggested that from pure dicta in 1782, the judicial capacity 
had become the “foundation rule of American constitutional law.”93 By 1909, 
Corwin began to call the doctrine, “judicial review,” and started work on his 
tentatively titled book, The Growth of Judicial Review.94  
Corwin proclaimed “the rationalistic background of American 
constitutional history.”95 Colleague Charles McIlwain’s interest in “tracing the 
history of certain legal ideas,” in particular, fundamental law and the 
                                                 
87 William Trickett, Judicial Dispensation from Congressional Statutes, 41 AM. L. REV. 65, 71 
(1907) 
88 CHARLES A. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 (1912).  
89 Id. at v (1938). 
90 1 RICHARD LOSS, Introduction, CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 17 (1981). 
91 G. Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. REV. 1463, 
1532 (2003); see L.B. Boudin, Government by Judiciary, 26 POL. SCI. Q. 238 (1911). 
92 Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Acts of Congress, 4 MICH. L. REV. 
616, 622, 625 (1906). 
93 Id. at 630. 
94 Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. REV. 643, 
660, 670 (1909) [hereinafter Corwin, Supreme Court]. 
95 Edward S. Corwin, The Establishment of Judicial Review, 9 MICH. L. REV. 102, 103 (1911) 
[hereinafter Corwin, Establishment]. 
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differentiation of legislation and adjudication, was influential.96 Corwin mocked 
“those who would insist upon its institutional background.”97 They were the 
“disciples of Savigny in the field of legal history,” swayed by “the doctrine of 
evolution.”98 Corwin argued that whenever the constitutional “Fathers” borrowed 
“from the past any of the really distinctive features of our constitutional system … 
they will be found to have taken them, not in the form of institutions tested and 
hammered into shape by practice, but as raw ideas.” His claim was clear: the 
Framers’ “indebtedness to the past was for ideas rather than for institutions.”99  
Corwin declared the “truth”: judicial review rested on foundations 
“entirely independent of American colonial history.”100 The origins of judicial 
review—the “idea of legislative power as limited”—were in the “idea of 
fundamental law.” All “law and doctrine” on judicial review “goes back finally to 
Coke’s famous dictum in Dr. Bonham’s Case.”101 Corwin repeated Gray’s 
genealogy, emphasizing Otis’ comment and declaring that “then and there 
American constitutional theory was born.”102 Although neither Otis nor Coke was 
mentioned at the Convention, Corwin declared that Winthrop was “totally 
unknown to those who brought about judicial review.”103   
The interest in ideas gathered strength. The 1911 publication of Max 
Farrand’s masterpiece, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 made 
easily accessible the Convention records.104 The original index contained no entry 
for “judicial review,” but did list “Laws contrary to the Constitution, power of the 
courts over.”105 In 1912, Charles Beard, an associate “professor of politics” at 
Columbia, reviewed the Constitutional Convention evidence in Farrand’s 
volumes. Beard concluded that “judicial control over legislation was implied in 
the provisions of the federal Constitution.”106 Beard’s inquiry into the “intention 
                                                 
96 CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY: AN 
HISTORICAL ESSAY ON THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION IN ENGLAND 
vii (1910). McIlwain stated that the contemporary debate over judicial power was of “utmost 
consequence.” Id. at viii-ix. 
97 Corwin, The Establishment, supra note 95, at 130. 
98 Id. at 102. 
99 Id. at 103.  
100 Id. at 104. 
101 Id. at 103-104. 
102 Id. at 106.  
103 Id. at 103. Framers did refer to Privy Council practice. See, e.g., 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION, supra note 4, at 164 (June 8) (including Pinckney’s statement that the “negative of 
the Crown had been found beneficial”); id. at 168 (presenting Madison’s statement regarding “the 
practice in Royal Colonies before the Revolution”). 
104 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1911). 
105 3 FARRAND, supra note 104, at 663, 665. 
106 BEARD, supra note 88, at 115; see also HORACE A. DAVIS, THE JUDICIAL VETO 43 (photo 
reprint 1971) (1914) (discussing same evidence for opposite conclusion). 
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of the framers” reframed the inquiry.107 Historian Andrew McLaughlin similarly 
acknowledged that “[p]robably this historical background—colonial experience, 
the nature and the practices of the imperial system—had its effect.” Indeed, 
without “this colonial experience the courts might not have come to exercise the 
power”; nonetheless, the “main line of argument and the main ideas” arose during 
the Revolution.108  
In 1914, Corwin described himself now as one of group of legal-historians 
“who represent judicial review as the natural outgrowth of ideas that were 
common property in the period when the Constitution was established.”109 The 
colonial practice argument had collapsed so quickly that his book, The Doctrine 
of Judicial Review, discussed it only in the notes. As the epigraph declared, 
quoting Maitland, “The history of law must be a history of Ideas.”110   
Corwin’s triumph was not absolute. At Columbia, students of Herbert 
Osgood and others continued to attempt to argue that colonial institutions and 
practices had contributed to constitutionalism. Arthur Meier Schlesinger 
described how the Privy Council was “analogous” to the Supreme Court and 
noted that appeals “involved the important principle of American jurisprudence 
which accords to the judiciary the power of declaring invalid an act of a 
subordinate legislature.”111 Elmer Beecher Russell showed pervasive Privy 
Council review of colonial legislation. He claimed that the colonists “thus became 
accustomed to a limitation upon the power of their legislatures.” As he put it, this 
practice was “at once a precedent and a preparation for the power of judicial 
annulment upon constitutional grounds.”112    
                                                 
107 BEARD, supra note 88, at 15-16; see Frank E. Melvin, The Judicial Bulwark of the Constitution, 
8 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 167 (1914) (discussing debate and Constitutional Convention evidence in 
detail). 
108 ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND PARTIES 102-103 (photo 
reprint 1972) (1912). McLaughlin’s student, Arthur P. Scott, had apparently searched for the early 
material. Id. at vi. He later published The Constitutional Aspects of the Parson’s Cause, 31 POL. 
SCI. Q. 558, 575 (1916) (arguing the three principles on which the power to declare a law 
unconstitutional rests were “clearly discernible” in Virginia cases relating to the two-penny act of 
1758). For the transitional shift towards fundamental law, see CHARLES GROVES HAINES, THE 
AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1914) (describing colonial practices but focusing 
on fundamental law as “’overruling law of nature or law of God”). 
109 Edward S. Corwin, Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review, 12 MICH. L. REV. 
538 (1914). 
110 CORWIN, DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 51, title page, 74-75. Corwin continued to 
explore the fundamental law claim into the 1920s. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE “HIGHER LAW’ 
BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955) (republishing Harvard Law Review 
articles of 1928-1929). 
111 Arthur Meier Schlesinger, Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council, 28 POL. SCI. Q. 279-97, 433-
50 (1913).  
112 ELMER BEECHER RUSSELL, THE REVIEW OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION BY THE KING IN COUNCIL 
227 (photo reprint 1976) (1915); see also GEORGE A. WASHBURNE, IMPERIAL CONTROL OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE THIRTEEN AMERICAN COLONIES, 1684-1776, at 189 (1923) 
(concluding that the Privy Council’s “function” became “the precedent for that power of judicial 
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It was all too late. Judicial review, indeed American constitutionalism, 
was comprised of legal ideas, not imperial or colonial institutions, politics, and 
practices. The Constitution broke American history in two. The colonial period 
led to the Revolution. The constitutional period began after. This redefinition 
doomed Columbia Law Professor Joseph Smith’s magnificent institutional and 
procedural account of the Privy Council’s appellate jurisdiction to a struggle over 
whether Privy Council review represented an idea about judicial or legislative 
authority.113  
III. Constitutionalism as Idea and Practice 
The time might be ripe to reconsider this depiction of the origins of 
judicial review and of constitutionalism as the history of ideas. As the Court’s 
politics changed, Corwin himself grew uncomfortable with his insistence on the 
“juristic doctrine of judicial review.” By the late 1930s, he acknowledged that 
judicial review is “a practice, an institution of government.”114 Judicial review, is 
both—an idea and a practice.   
Contemporary constitutional scholars have begun to show renewed 
interest in the conception of constitutionalism as practice. Lawrence Sager 
analyzes our “constitutional practice.”115 Richard Fallon discusses 
“implementing” constitutional norms through practice.116 Barry Friedman 
advocates abandonment of the “predominantly normative” approach to judicial 
review for the positive and descriptive approach of contemporary political 
science.117 These scholars recognize that for far too long, American 
constitutionalism has been only about ideas, not practices.  
                                                                                                                                     
annulment of legislation exercised at the present time … by the Supreme Court.”). Beecher and 
Russell were students of Herbert Osgood. 
113 See JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN 
PLANTATIONS (1950); see also Julius Goebel, Jr., ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 
(HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES) (1971), 1-142. 
114 EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN 
INSTRUMENT FOR POPULAR GOVERNMENT 16, 17 (Gloucester, 1957) (1938). Corwin struggled to 
reconcile his growing perception that modern judicial review was a practice and the more 
extensive colonial evidence with his declaration that the colonial practices could not have the 
“force of precedents” because no Framer discussed them. Id. at 17-25. For recent scholarship on 
the origins reflecting this tension between an awareness of earlier practices and the continued 
focus on legal ideas, see William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 455, 468 n. 45 (2005); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (2004); Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty, 
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (2003). 
115 LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRACTICE (2004).  
116 RICHARD H. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001). 
117 Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 259 (2005); see also Barry 
Friedman, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 90 (1998) (suggesting a theory of 
sedimentary constitutionalism that sees “the creation of constitutional law as a gradual societal 
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As this brief historiography suggests, the conception of judicial review as 
an idea developed from the approach taken to the question rather than because it 
was the inherently correct answer. Cases and Convention records could be read as 
textual evidence in a closed intellectual system that revealed a coherent idea about 
judicial power. It was much harder to prove definitively that everyday colonial 
political practices had formed a set of assumptions about limited legislative 
authority. These differing conclusions about the origins of judicial review also 
rested on larger disciplinary assumptions. The influence of Dr. Bonham’s Case 
presumed a certain autonomy of legal ideas across time and space; the claim of 
colonial practice presumed a certain degree of continuity despite American 
independence; the argument for a new political science presumed a certain 
discontinuity and rejection of English and colonial constitutionalism.  
  The recovery of the importance of colonial practices to the origins of 
judicial review does not need to result in the abandonment of the importance of 
legal ideas and doctrines. Discussing judicial review as practice, however, 
demonstrates that at least some ideas of American constitutionalism have their 
origins in political and legal experience rather than the legal imagination. 
Reconstructing the origins of judicial review in English and colonial practice 
resurrects an earlier idea about limited legislative authority and thus enriches 
contemporary discussions of American constitutionalism. Finally, the recognition 
that American constitutionalism is the result of new political ideas and the 
adaptation of older legal and political practices demonstrates that aspects arising 
from the adaptation of colonial constitutionalism coexist in tension with those 
arising from post-Revolutionary theories of governance. As a historical matter, 
American constitutionalism was not a single, coherent political science. 
Judicial review was not invented by historians, political scientists, or law 
professors.  Because judicial review arose from a colonial practice, history has 
something to contribute. Because judicial review was rationalized as compatible 
with a written constitution and separation of powers, political science has 
something to contribute. Because judicial review involves interpreting the 
boundary between legitimate legislative power and unconstitutional authority, law 
has something to contribute. We may not be able to stop calling the practice 
judicial review, but scholars can begin to think more critically and constructively 
about the ways in which the story of its origins has often been the story of 
ourselves and our unspoken disciplinary assumptions. 
